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Britain’s	global	negotiating	position	is	weaker	after
the	G7	Summit
The	leaders	of	the	G7	meet	annually	to	affirm	the	strength	of	their	relationships	and	chart	the	steps	to
further	deepen	their	ties.	The	G7	is	a	key	forum	for	the	UK,	as	it	is	the	only	governance	group	that
includes	both	the	EU	and	the	US,	the	two	most	important	entities	with	whom	the	British	government	is
negotiating	new	trade	agreements	–	one	more	distant	and	one	more	close,	respectively.	Tristen
Naylor	writes	that	Theresa	May	has	returned	from	this	year’s	summit	in	Charlevoix,	Canada	in	a
weaker	negotiating	position	relative	to	both	the	US	and	EU,	though	through	no	fault	of	her	own.
President	Donald	Trump’s	actions	at	the	summit,	while	damaging	to	the	club,	are	useful	for	helping
project	what	trajectory	US-UK	negotiations	over	a	post-Brexit	trade	agreement	are	likely	to	take.	President	Trump’s
levying	of	steel	and	aluminium	tariffs	on	America’s	closest	allies	in	advance	of	the	summit	and,	immediately	after	the
summit,	reneging	on	the	G7	communiqué,	to	which	he	had	only	hours	before	agreed,	demonstrates	that	structural
and	historical	ties	do	not	factor	into	his	foreign	policy	and	diplomatic	–	to	the	extent	that	it	might	be	described	as	such
–	approach.
While	it	is	a	dogmatic	ritual	to	extol	the	‘special	relationship’	between	the	US	and	the	UK,	there	is	no	country	with	a
longer,	closer,	deeper	relationship	with	the	US	than	Canada.	The	uniqueness	of	this	relationship	did	not	stop	the
Trump	Administration	from	declaring	that	there	is	a	‘special	place	in	hell’	for	the	Canadian	Prime	Minister.	Canada
has	been	spared	neither	the	unprecedented	protectionism	nor	the	ad	hominem	invective	of	the	US	President.	There
is	no	reason	to	expect	that	Britain	will	be	treated	any	differently.	Indeed,	the	UK’s	diplomatic	overtures	on	NATO,	the
Paris	Accord,	and	the	Iran	Nuclear	Agreement	already	show	that	the	Trump	Administration	gives	little	credence	to
the	so-called	special	relationship.
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The	G7	has	also	afforded	a	further	opportunity	to	observe	that	a	key	tactic	of	the	Trump	administration	is	to	exploit	an
imbalance	in	negotiation	interests.	The	UK	needs	a	new,	post-Brexit	trade	agreement	with	the	US	far	more	than	the
US	needs	such	a	deal.	The	renegotiation	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	was	a	key	topic	on	the
sidelines	of	the	summit,	particularly	as	concerns	Trump	administration’s	willingness	to	walk	away	from	negotiations
over	the	inclusion	of	a	sunset	clause	(more	on	that	below).	The	Trump	administration	willing	to	exercise	such	a	hard
bargaining	tactic	because	of	a	perception	that	the	Canada	and	Mexico	need	NAFTA	more	than	the	American	does.
Believing	that	they	are	relatively	impervious	to	the	consequences	of	not	reaching	an	agreement,	American	trade
negotiators	are	willing	to	use	this	perceived	freedom	as	leverage	to	push	for	concessions	favouring	the	US.	While	the
collapse	of	NAFTA	would,	in	fact,	hobble	the	US	economy,	this	is	not	the	case	with	a	US-UK	trade.	There	would	be
almost	no	discernible	effect	on	the	US	if	no	agreement	is	reached,	while	it	would	disproportionately,	negatively	affect
a	post-Brexit	UK.	This	imbalance	in	negotiation	interests	and	the	US’	revealed	willingness	to	exploit	it	further
disadvantages	the	UK’s	strategic	bargaining	position.
The	Trump	administration’s	demand	for	the	inclusion	of	a	sunset	clause	in	the	NAFTA	agreement,	automatically
terminating	it	after	five	years	unless	all	the	parties	resign,	was	widely	discussed	on	the	summit’s	margins,	with
Canada	unconditionally	opposing	such	a	clause.	Indeed,	it	was	in	response	to	Mr	Trudeau	affirming	Canada’s
position	on	the	prospect	of	a	sunset	clause	that	prompted	Mr	Trump	to	reneg	on	the	communiqué	and	deride
Trudeau	as	‘dishonest	and	weak’.	The	American	President’s	obsession	with	the	inclusion	of	a	sunset	clause	in	a
trade	agreement	appears	to	be	related	to	his	obsession	with	what	he	perceives	to	be	trade	deficits	stemming	from
existing	agreements.	The	Trump	administration’s	position	is	that	a	sunset	clause	would	allow	the	US	to	cancel	the
agreement	if	there	is	an	unacceptable	trade	imbalance,	which	he	believes	the	US	has	with	Canada.	While,	the	US
actually	has	a	trade	surplus	with	Canada,	as	it	does	with	the	UK,	the	American	President’s	persistent	belief	that
America	is	continually	being	taken	advantage	of	by	its	closest	allies	will	almost	certainly	condition	the	US-UK
negotiations,	as	it	has	the	NAFTA	negotiations.	The	trouble	for	the	UK	is	that	a	sunset	clause	would	reduce	overall
market	predictability,	diminishing	the	confidence	that	is	necessary	for	UK	businesses	to	redirect	trade	toward	the	US
after	Brexit.	It	would	thus	undercut	the	government’s	claim	that	a	new	US-UK	agreement	would	offset	the	damage
caused	by	leaving	the	single	market.	Thersa	May	is	unlikely	to	be	any	more	persuasive	than	Justin	Trudeau	in	luring
the	American	President	away	from	his	mindset,	particularly	given	that	under	the	auspices	of	the	current	US-EU	trade
regime,	in	which	the	US	is	indeed	running	a	deficit	(though,	one	that	is	$50	billion	less	than	Mr	Trump	claims).
The	EU	and	its	leading	members	were	also	witnesses	to	the	drama	of	this	year’s	G7.	Knowing	that	the	likelihood	of
the	UK	securing	a	favourable	trade	agreement	with	the	US	is	thus	reduced,	the	EU’s	strategic	position	is
strengthened.	With	the	prospect	of	the	UK‘s	‘outside	option’	with	the	US	lessened,	the	EU	can	push	even	more
strongly	for	the	nature	of	the	post-Brexit	trading	relationship	look	relatively	like	that	which	the	UK	and	EU	already
has.	May	thus	comes	away	from	the	Charlevoix	G7	with	both	the	US	and	EU	positioned	with	significant	leverage
over	her	government.
This	is	not	to	say	that	a	US-UK	deal	is	unlikely,	only	that	it	is	less	likely	to	be	one	favourable	–	or	even	palatable	–	to
the	UK.	Indeed,	Trump	now	has	further	incentive	to	negotiate	an	agreement	with	May.	Given	the	American
President’s	preference	for	bilateralism,	May	is	offering	to	engage	him	via	his	preferred	means	of	negotiation,	albeit
one	through	which	he	is	likely	to	exploit	strategic	advantages	while	disregarding	the	US’	strategic	interests	and	its
shared	history	with	its	allies,	as	is	his	modus	operandi.	Otherwise	faced	with	the	US’	G7	partners’	preference	for
multilateralism,	Trump	has	a	chance	to	engage	in	a	manner	that	suits	him.	Moreover,	forging	a	US-UK	agreement
would	provide	Trump	with	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	that	he	is,	in	fact,	able	to	work	with	the	US’	democratic,
Western	allies,	despite	walking	away	from	key	agreements	like	the	Paris	Accord	and	the	Iran	Deal,	let	alone
fundamental	tenets	of	the	liberal	order,	such	as	an	unwavering	commitment	to	resist	protectionism.	It	is	likewise
important	for	the	American	President	to	do	so	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	he	is	able	to	build	positive	relationships
with	the	US’	traditional	partners,	not	just	with	illiberal	dictatorships	like	North	Korea.
Indeed,	the	UK	ought	to	be	looking	at	North	Korea’s	playbook	for	ideas	on	how	to	get	President	Trump	favourably	to
the	table,	as	the	American	President	is	actually	very	predictable	when	it	comes	to	responding	to	particular	incentives
that	allow	him	to	be	portrayed	as	the	great	deal	maker	he	fancies	himself	to	be.	Such	tactics	would	be	particularly
useful	during	Trump’s	visit	to	the	UK	on	the	13th	of	July.
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In	all,	while	this	year’s	G7	summit	indicates	the	UK	is	in	a	weaker	bargaining	position	with	its	two	major	trade
partners	than	it	was	previously	thought	to	be,	North	Korea’s	success	with	the	Singapore	summit,	immediately
following	the	club’s	meeting	in	Canada,	gives	some	hints	for	how	the	UK	government	might	overcome	its
disadvantage	as	it	negotiates	with	the	Trump	administration.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of		LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	
Dr	Tristen	Naylor	is	Fellow	in	International	Relations	at	LSE	and	Deputy	Director,	G20	Research	Group,	London.
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